The current contribution seeks to start a conversation around our pedagogical practice in respect of abortion law. Centralising the traditional portrayal of abortion law within the medical law curriculum, this essay highlights the privileging of a very particular storyline about abortion. Exploring the terrain in evaluating medical law methodologies, this essay highlights the illusion of 'balance', 'objectivity', and 'neutrality' that emerges from current pedagogy in light of how abortion law is framed and in particular what is excluded: women's own voices. Focusing on a number of 'exclusions' and 'silences' and noting how closely these mirror dominant discourse in the public sphere, this essay highlights the irony of a curriculum that reflects, rather than challenges, these discursive gaps. Arguing that the setting of a curriculum is inevitably political, ambitions for delivering a programme around abortion that is 'neutral', 'objective', or 'balanced' are dismissed. Instead, highlighting the problems of what is currently excluded, how materials are ordered, and the tacit hierarchies that lend legitimacy and authority to a particular way of 'knowing' abortion, this essay argues for a new curriculum and a new storylineone which is supported by prior learning in feminist legal scholarship and a medical law curriculum in which the social, historical, geographical, and above all, personal is everpresent and central.
I. INTRODUCTION
I knew from the moment I found out that I didn't want to carry the pregnancy to term, but I was overwhelmed by images everywhere telling me that it was 'wrong' to consider abortion. When I searched for information on the Internet, I was bombarded by religious websites with brutal pictures of aborted foetuses. When I tried to go to my friends for help, I was told they were 'so excited' and couldn't wait for me to have a baby. My boyfriend kept saying how much he of concerns that fall outside its scope. Starting with an autobiographical note as to why a topic like abortion law might be particularly provocative of the question as to what it means to 'teach well', my concern that contemporary abortion law curricula falls short of that standard is then linked to the field of medical law and ethics more generally. I claim that the close union between the disciplines of law and ethics results in a methodological unity that privileges a very particular way of thinking, knowing and seeing topics like abortion. Exploring the methodologies that frame this topic, I highlight the illusion of 'balance', 'objectivity', and 'neutrality' that emerges from current pedagogy around abortion in light of what is excluded from the map of abortion law. Focusing on a number of 'exclusions' and 'silences' and highlighting how closely these reflect abortion discourse in the public sphere, I note the irony of a medical law curriculum that reflects, rather than challenges, these discursive gaps. Arguing that the setting of a curriculum is inevitably political, 2 I dismiss (or come to terms with) ambitions for delivering a programme around abortion that is 'neutral', 'objective', or 'balanced'. Instead, highlighting the problems of what is currently excluded, how materials are ordered, and the tacit hierarchies that lend legitimacy and authority to a particular way of 'knowing' abortion, I argue for a rethink of our curriculum and a brand new storyline-one which is supported by prior learning in feminist legal scholarship, and a medical law curriculum in which the social, historical, geographical, and above all, personal is ever-present and central.
II. ABORTION LAW PEDAGOGY: OBJECTIVITY AND NEUTRALITY
Relieved. I made a stupid mistake and I paid for it. This is over now and do not wish to go through it again. I've learnt my lesson. I will be super careful in the future. . . . I did not have anyone to turn to. I didn't tell anyone, not my boyfriend, my parents, not my sister, not my girlfriends. I will carry this secret to my grave. I do not feel guilty because there is no way I can carry on with it. I am not ready, my boyfriend is not ready, my parents will be so disappointed in me. This abortion is for the greater good of everyone involved. I believe that if I am not able to provide the best for a child, I am not ready to have a baby. 3 No topic has provoked in me so much anxiety around teaching as abortion law. It brings to the fore the range of conceptions that I have tacitly harboured around 'excellent' pedagogy. While hardly taught as apolitical or neutral, the delivery of other subjects, such as contract law or torts, more neatly align with my hazily held view that there is a 'right and proper' way to teach law. Much of what is exciting about legal studies is the debate, the argument, and the reasoning. We actively encourage the development of strong research skills and a creative mind-set so that a moot, for example, can be won through resourceful research, persuasive and imaginative argument-just as it can be lost on precisely the same facts. In torts, while students will get some insight into my own views, I am every bit as happy for students to be exposed to perspectives that take an opposite view and to engage in debate. That is so, despite recognising that the debate around the goods and ills of tort is skewed. Despite our strong emphasis upon how tort operates in the 'real world' and the small number of beneficiaries it touches, 4 the airtime necessarily afforded to an internal view of torts and its technical minutiae risks overwhelming the very political and social perspectives we invite students to take on board. In foundational subjects, I take some refuge in the fact that there is less scope for creativity and that my politics will automatically be positioned as an awkward counterbalance simply by virtue of the constraints of delivering a qualifying law degree.
Nevertheless, the pedagogical terrain shifts with seismic force when it comes to medical law and reproductivity. The subjects have immediacy and seem so much more foundational to the living of a good life; when coupled with the greater scope for creativity and authorship in what and how we teach, the question of what it means to teach medical law well is more forcefully provoked. When abortion is centralised, it becomes apparent that the stance I adopt on legal pedagogy rides on the back of implausible beliefs in the ideals of neutrality and objectivity. I am not neutral on this subject. I am aware of myself operating in the same pedagogical space as an instructor, an agent with subjective beliefs, and a political actor. This gives rise to a set of conflicting responsibilities around a topic that can be taught in radically different ways in accordance with those roles. I cannot simultaneously execute all of the things I aspire to be on this topic in the classroom nor find harmony between them. I can try, of course, to 'appear' objective and neutral-to hold back my own views and defer to students as they engage in debate around a wide range of issues, including the status of the foetus and women's rights in the abortion context. Both foetus and woman find their position within those debates and perhaps this has felt at times like some kind of balance. In some ways these techniques, the search for answers, the thrill of debate, the tallying up of reasons in either direction as to where the balance of interests should lie, seems harmless enough. This is part and parcel of our disciplinary method, of argument, contestation, and adversarial practice. But here lies the rub: before the topic is even introduced, my answers are all stacked up and they were arrived at by a very different set of materials and considerations which students rarely get a look into. It is for this reason that while this topic is debated, by virtue of what is privileged and what is marginalised, the terms of that debate leave me feeling queasy.
The pressure to teach in this way and to exclude the very perspectives that enrich my understanding of abortion (and law) is considerable. First it is normal in the field of medical law and ethics to miss out precisely the things I would like to focus on. Secondly, there is only so much we can fit into the medical law syllabus, so plenty will be missed out. Thirdly, the things I would concentrate upon, do not easily fit traditional curricula. As I discuss below, my approach looks explicitly political-feminist and pro-choice-so that some might wonder what kind of 'medical law' is really being delivered. And it is this which provokes a fourth interrelated concern. What I propose will sound for some close to 'brainwashing', 'indoctrinating students', seeking to prejudice 'the outcome of the discussion by stating one's own view', evangelism', 6 becoming 'too entangled, too personally invested or too emotional', 7 all of which seem to sit at odds with the delivery of rigorous teaching. In truth, I do want to influence my students' judgement, albeit my preference is for them to be engaged in a process of active learning and discovery in a subject that they regard as important, legitimate, and worthwhile-and to deliver a subject that sits well with my conscience.
It is finding this balance which has proved problematic for me. One approach has been to play within the traditional boundaries of the subject, to hope that through informed debate, pushing more challenging materials into the mix to 'enrich' and 'supplement' the textbooks, and through gentle handling, that students will find their way towards my (liberal) views. But I am increasingly doubtful of this. Even if we can all point to the many students that detect our political leanings and attempt to mirror these in class or in essays-there is a great difference between what is said and what is understood, believed-and critically, sustained. Many students learn to talk the talk in a way that sounds thoroughly aligned with women's rights for example, but that can quickly be disrupted to reveal incredibly fragile foundations of what is understood by the labels of 'bodily integrity' and 'reproductive autonomy'. So, when it comes to reproductivity, and to abortion, which constitutes the touchstone of the subject, at those disenchanted points, I have continued to return to the question of what creative scope and political autonomy I possess while teaching abortion law while still teaching the subject well.
The search for answers has brought me here. The idea that the subject (or any) can be taught objectively or neutrally, of course is a myth. Nevertheless, the fact that there is 'no view from nowhere' brings into play considerations as to how it is currently taught and which (or whose) views frame and dominate the portrayal of abortion law. This resonates with Haraway's comment that the notion of objectivity, 'has been about a search for translation, convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality -which I call reductionism, when one language (guess whose) must be enforced as the standard for all the translations and conversions'. 8 Attention to the materials and concerns deemed constitutive of medical law and ethics then will always reveal a particular perspective, and even if not deliberative, a framing. As I argue in respect of abortion, analysis of the conventional framing of medical law reveals a very particular approach which determines the 'what' and 'how' of medico-legal evaluation. In turn, these approaches structure, command, and normalise how we see medico-legal issues; indeed in this respect, the traditional curriculum in its strong embrace of traditional 'ethics' affords some illusion of neutrality, balance, and objectivity and if we do not think too much about it, it can feel like all of the key characters we should expect to be present are there. Nevertheless, closer attention to the order by which those characters make their appearance and their precise characterisation reveals a powerful framing of abortion-and one which I believe runs counter to what is needed to teach abortion law well.
III. THE UNION OF MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS I had a medical abortion at 8 weeks of pregnancy when I was 20 years old. The pregnancy was accidental -I took St John's Wort for depression, and didn't realise it affected the Pill. My boyfriend at the time told me that if I kept the baby, he wouldn't want anything to do with it. I didn't want to be a single mother, I was in the middle of university, and I had no means of supporting a child. I was not quite sure, in fact, if I even wanted to have children at all. 9 The manner by which abortion is represented in medical law and ethics is the query here. What is 'missing' from the curricula is the 'everyday'-the very dimension of abortion that makes abortion law as a subject make sense but also tells us why we should care. The 'everyday' incorporates a wide range of concerns, non-exhaustively, from women's own experiences, clinical practitioner's experiences of abortion service delivery, anti-abortion 'guerrilla strategies', and abortion in a global and historical context. Not all of this will seem strictly legal, but all of it constitutes the social landscape in which abortion rights and laws are constructed, lived, maintained, and disputed. As such, these perspectives prove critical for an informed view of the role that law does, can, and should play. Combined, these concerns make more apparent the wider range of variables which impact hard on women's reproductive freedom (e.g. religiosity, attitudes towards women, intersecting forms of discrimination, mobilisation of the medical profession) and situate abortion as an aspect of a broader struggle for civil rights. That little of this should come to command our attention in conventional medical law and ethics, tells us something quite important about our field.
The field of medical law constitutes a potentially fascinating site for interdisciplinary evaluation and is rich with problem domains that invite more sociologically orientated work. Of course, there is a long tradition of medical lawyers borrowing from other fields, as well as a modest increase in recent years in empiricism, but the vast majority of our work is more discernibly anchored by analytical legal and ethical approaches, with quite some deference to the latter as an approach for thinking through the expanding field of concerns constitutive of medical law. The concern I grapple with here shares much in common with the concern expressed by Jonathan Montgomery who, discussing Margo Brazier's work, highlights the importance of a 'focus on the perspectives of the people involved, rather than building a framework from abstract principle' and the importance of 'know-how' as well as 'know-that' to provide 'an important counter-balance to work that is too narrowly focused on lawyers' law and bioethicists' principles'. 10 Nevertheless, how to build a habit in which 'the social' is centralised may require more than telling lawyers that the social is important. Most lawyers will probably see this as obvious. Rather it seems to me that what is needed is a deconstruction of the rather monogamous disciplinary-coupling between law and ethics and the peculiar unity of habits that they share-notably, a strong inclination towards the theoretical than the empirical.
11 Nevertheless, for 'mainstream bioethics' in particular, this resistance towards sociological, political, and behavioural perspectives seems far more ideologically rooted. That medical law has come to find such comfort in the company of bioethics in particular is problematic. As I argue below, this concern finds its roots in a broader critique around how bioethical approaches define what is ethically relevant (and what is not).
By virtue of a purported failure to engage with the social sciences and empirical approaches, bioethics has become an extremely popular target for critique.
12 This particular criticism typically comes from social scientists who claim that mainstream bioethics is largely dominated by moral philosophy. 13 At the heart of calls for bioethics to become more 'social scientific', 'interdisciplinary', or 'critical', is a concern with the legitimacy of moral philosophical method for addressing bioethical problems. The alleged dominance of philosophical bioethics has been argued as being problematic for being 'yoked to abstracts of reason and theory' so that 'judgements about matters of bioethics frequently outstrip the contexts that generate and shape those matters and ignore the agonizing experiences of the people who grapple with them'.
14 Critics point out that while moral philosophers draw distinctions between the descriptive and the normative, fact and value, 'is' and 'ought', that these merely constitute artefacts 'of the theoretical project of justification, [rather than] an intrinsic feature of moral experience'. 15 As a result, it has been claimed that the distance which philosophical bioethics maintains from real social settings undermines the ability of bioethics to have purchase for addressing problems in the real world. Some have asserted this more strongly still; as Verkerk and Lindemann argue, The idea of abstract impartiality that has characterized traditional ethics must be abandoned as not only unattainable but dangerous . . . it is all too easy for those who aspire to that ideal to import the prejudices and preoccupations of their own social group into their theorizing under the guise of false universality. . . . If, from her perspective, she sees morally important considerations that others have missed, the others could very likely return the compliment. In this sense, morality is genuinely democratic: there is no humanly accessible vantage point that assures the authority of anyone's moral judgments, including the professional ethicist's. This means that the bioethicist, like everyone else, can only speak from her own knowledge and experience. For Adam Hedgecoe, the concern is the extent to which philosophical method has dominated bioethics. 17 He argues that contemporary bioethics suffers from a serious theory-practice gap where the ethical issues that philosophical bioethicists imagine to be central to real-world problems can actually turn out to be fairly irrelevant on closer investigation. Central to Hedgecoe's critique is a call for the development of a 'critical bioethics' rooted in empirical research and a 'bottom-up' approach which investigates how real people experience moral dilemmas. This, he argues can point to a range of quite different considerations from those seen as central in bioethical texts and would demand that all ethical theories were subject to revision.
18 Also pointing to 'the increasingly formalized and institutionalized set of writings, methods, and organizations that fall under the bioethics umbrella', Belkin highlights the risk of bioethics 'missing salient aspects of what make a moral dilemma, a dilemma'. 19 As Hedgecoe comments, 'what counts as an ethical problem in the first place, prior to the application of ethical theory, is socially constructed'.
20 Attention to the manner by which our disciplines discipline how we see, raises a clear problem in the context of bioethics: what factors count as ethically relevant and which do not?
From feminist quarters, a long-standing complaint of bioethics has been the exclusion of the experiences and concerns of women and the complexities of the contexts in which women find themselves. 21 Resonating with such concerns, the exclusion of social context and the questions it raises of contemporary bioethics has also been highlighted powerfully by Hedgecoe. Citing a study by Rayna Rapp into prenatal testing for Down syndrome, he notes how one of the 'least important issues for women contemplating pre-natal testing and/or abortion' was the 'moral status of the embryo'. Constituting a 'classic topic of concern for bioethicists', he argues that in practice 'a more important factor for these women is the impact the birth of a disabled child might have on already existing people and relationships'. 22 Hedgecoe contends that 'bioethicists who wish to engage with ethical decisions as they are lived in the real world would be better employed turning their attention towards the rights and duties . . . that are involved in relationships with other people, and how these are affected by the arrival of a Down's baby, rather than the moral status of the embryo'. 23 Instead, as Hedgecoe notes, the likely response of philosophers would be to say that 'the subjective experience of a stressful, emotional medical intervention . . . has no role to play in a rational consideration of the ethics of prenatal diagnosis'.
24
Those claiming that the field has more recently enjoyed an 'empirical turn' will likely reject this depiction of bioethics. Nevertheless, on the basis of how bioethics publically represents itself at least, it is not apparent that the field substantially differs from Hedgecoe's portrayal. 25 Some philosophers have explicitly claimed that bioethical problems cannot be resolved by 'appeal to or use of empirical evidence'; as Bennett and Cribb highlight, this argument positions empirical research and public consultation as interesting, but not relevant in providing 'the answers as to the morality of the problem in hand'. 26 Underlying this concern is that subjective preferences run wholly at odds with the project of moral philosophy which is normative in nature. Take John Harris' view that, [D] iscovering what the public thinks about issues of ethical significance is not the same as discovering the ethical values of the public. And finding out what the public thinks it acceptable to do about issues of ethical importance is not the same as finding out what the public finds ethically acceptable.
27
Most certainly, there are others who take a more nuanced stance, and the relationship between empirical research and the normative work of bioethics remains the subject of ongoing debate. 28 Nevertheless, a broader review of the field reveals that characterisations of bioethics as having enjoyed an empirical turn seem rather premature.
29
This critique of bioethics raises important questions over the 'applied' nature of (bio)ethics, and whose version of morality is being applied here. Central to this problem is what we need to know in order to form normative judgements and the extent to which we are appraised of the 'social facts'. The concerns expressed about bioethics thus far are amplified further in my view by the rather confused debates around moral expertise, and in particular the relationship between 'non-moral facts' and 'morally relevant facts'. 30 Whatever the distinction between the two, on some accounts what a moral philosopher seems to need to know (and not know) is alarming. 31 As has been argued elsewhere, these kinds of arm-chair ethical evaluations in the context of science and technology, devoid of the very social, political, economic, and historical factors that give them meaning, can result in a serious miscasting of problems and solutions. 32 No doubt it is a great deal easier to undertake an ethical evaluation at a distance (and involves less energy still in the abstract), but it may well be that those from the empirical sciences are more aware than those situated in more normatively orientated disciplines 33 how 'distance lends enchantment'. 34 Awareness of what we do not know more often than not, dictates the need to get closer, and sometimes, right into the thick of it.
35
IV. THE SHAPE OF ABORTION LAW: THE PROBLEM OF INCLUSIVENESS Irresponsible, relieved, angry, ashamed, guilty, sad. I was all of the above THEN but I no longer feel guilt -although it has taken five years for me to let go of all that pain and guilt. It is society that forces guilt upon us in order to keep us submissive and inferior but I am an intelligent human being who made a difficult but responsible choice and I would make the same decision again if necessary.
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That we need to get closer to the social contexts of the problems that fit within the corpus of medical law and ethics is the central argument. My claim is that the bioethical approach highlighted above, one that is characterised by abstract principle and distance from the social settings in which ethical dilemmas play out and are experienced, is deeply rooted in medical law pedagogy. This claim will strike some as immediately suspect. How can this author possess insight into the manner by which medical law or indeed, abortion is taught and delivered? The full range of module materials made available to students are rarely visible to external actors, and indeed, given my earlier assertion that we have enormous scope for authorship on non-foundational subjects, lecturers may be delivering programmes in far more creative ways than this author imagines to be the case. My assertion is based on a range of sources including, insight into how actors at a range of other institutions deliver topics such as abortion, my own pedagogical practices and the medical law curricula I have inherited from colleagues and peers, the occasional availability of detailed online materials, and significantly, the continuing centrality of the medical law and ethics textbook as 'key reading' in the delivery of such courses in many law schools in the UK. 37 In this latter respect, the medical law and ethics text is used here as an indicative (though not exclusive) artefact of how abortion law is most typically framed.
A sweep through the range of medical law texts available highlights the rather narrow and traditional framing of abortion as a problem domain. 38 Insofar as I have intimated that the close coupling of medical law and ethics requires greater scrutiny, this is by virtue of the range of concerns which are excluded or contested in terms of their moral relevancy. The cross-fertilisation of a decontextualised approach to topics like abortion should be seen as problematic by virtue of inviting a kind of moralising which misses out critical aspects of dilemmas which can only be identified through Had an Abortion -Women on Web' (n 3). 37 This is not at all surprising given the range of concerns and volume of material we seek to cover in medical law and ethics. An online search to identify the use of a series of textbooks in this subject (e.g. see n 38) reveals a significant number of law schools that treat these as 'core', 'recommended', or 'key'. insight into the social contexts in which they occur. The absence of and lack of interest in the social dimensions and shape of the problems we examine, should leave us not only sceptical of the 'moral principles' being applied, but also the 'solutions' they render. The idea that traditional medical ethics and bioethics privilege a particular way of knowing is hardly news. Over two decades ago, Susan Sherwin complained of the liberal and conservative representation of topics like abortion and the lip service paid to a feminist perspective. 39 The uptake and impact of traditional ethics on healthcare law texts, and the overt exclusion of feminist ethics also concerned Leslie Bender. 40 As she noted then, most bioethics and law books offered,
[T]heoretical overviews of ethical theories and concepts that will be used through the course to understand and solve medical ethical dilemmas. These overviews traditionally outline nonfeminist ethical models -utilitarian/consequentialist and deontological/Kantian theoretical approaches with a small section focusing on the problems of moral relativism -but never mention feminist analysis. 41 We can note, of course, important shifts in approach and coverage with the subsequent maturation of the field of medical law and ethics; the work of prominent feminist scholars now constitute staples in many mainstream medical law texts, with feminist 'ethics' often incorporated into the long list of ethical approaches (e.g. 'no account of medical ethics would be complete without . . .'
42
). Nevertheless, while constituting an important addition, one is left with the overwhelming sense that feminism is a bolt-on to a subject so thoroughly aligned to traditional ethics that much of it runs against what a feminist commitment entails. The aim is not to downplay the value that mainstream medical law (and ethics) texts have played. Textbooks are important vehicles for delivering a mass of information and critique to students and indeed, constitute an important resource for lecturers, including the present author. Nevertheless, what I do question is the positioning of textbooks and our dependence upon them in the curriculum in light of what looks like an extracted mash of perspectives which in their fuller logic fatally clash, yet are presented in such a way as to offer an illusion of synthesis and balance.
On all accounts, these questions arise by virtue of returning to these texts and paying close attention to the portrayal of subjects like abortion. In particular, I refer to the ordering and selection of materials and the specific characterisations of 'parties' in abortion that contribute to the idea that where the regulatory lines are drawn is a subject-matter upon which reasonable opinion can diverge:
To some, we will have seen the shocking failure of our law to protect the most vulnerable members of our society (unborn children) from being killed. To others, we will have seen the struggle for control over women's bodies, especially during pregnancy. Although women now have some control over their reproductive bodies, this control is said by some only to be to the extent that it is permitted by the male-dominated legal or medical establishment. 43 All too often, the primary character introduced in the textbook story of abortion law is the foetus. Consideration as to its status is typically selected as the first major substantive issue, which of course, feels natural enough because that is how it is done. But we might now wonder how this starting point operates so as to frame the debate in the reader's mind. While seemingly 'counterbalanced' with a later section exploring women's rights and reproductive autonomy, the extent to which there is really any balancing going on at all is contestable in light of how women's rights are represented; they remain, in every sense, abstracted and in constant competition with someone or something else's 'interests'. In similar force, and it is to be expected in a medical law text, an outline of the Abortion Act 1967 and statistics around the incidence of abortion typically make an early textual entrance. Naturally, we expect students to learn 'what the law says', but the point at which we require them to, may well be pivotal. But relating to each of these points, my overarching concern is with what is missing. This relates in no small part to the traditional view that the topic of abortion law and ethics must be principally concerned with 'traditional law and ethics'. Nevertheless, in the midst of constructing programmes dense in case law, statute, and broader legal instruments, as well as the raft of 'ethical considerations', we need to look very closely at what we have been inclined to miss out. What is excluded proves, in my view, to be critical to understanding what abortion law is about.
Of course, my centralisation of the textbook as a key pedagogical tool could be seen as conveniently excluding the broader range of literature which students are also likely to be exposed to, including work from leading journals such as the present one. 44 One could argue that these materials might serve to create wider awareness in the student's mind as to the presence of different perspectives. Nevertheless, a number of things press quite heavily against that view. The first relates to the tacit hierarchy of 'materials' and the presumptive weight that a text carries in the student's mind:
The presumption is that if a law book or academic publisher binds the materials between hard (or even soft) covers, the likelihood that the materials are appropriate for the study of the subject increase. At least some authority, here, the publisher, has validated the collection. 45 As Bender argues, in the hierarchy of readings, single texts which compile all the relevant cases and materials, 'top individual, professor-prepared materials'. 46 Secondly, while challenging literature exists that incorporates some of the perspectives that I 43 ibid. 44 My thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point. 45 Bender (n 40) 1252. 46 ibid. point to in the remainder of this essay, my own view of the field is that a lecturer would be hard-pressed to find within the field of medical law a collection of materials that simultaneously delivers: something that looks like 'medical law' while also embracing the kind of alternative approach that I suggest is needed-one that deflates the law, centralises empirical insights, women's accounts of their own experiences, and broad geopolitical and historical accounts of abortion-that kind of coverage, I believe is not typical of medical law. Nevertheless, even if I should be taken to task on this latter point, as I argue below, my view is that we need to do a great deal more than bolting on different perspectives via collections of journal articles and monograph excerpts to supplement key texts in order to achieve understanding in our students as to what precisely is at stake in relation to abortion law. In no small measure, this requires addressing the incommensurability between the traditional medical law and ethics approach, and what a feminist perspective demands. It is these kinds of concerns that lead me to believe that the mere inclusion of 'feminist perspectives' within the wider medical law and ethics curricula can only ever give 'lip service' to feminist perspectives-and in doing so, will always run counter to what feminist perspectives and women require.
What seems to me to be necessary is a fundamental review of what and how we teach, a closer examination of the broader pedagogical politics of inclusion and exclusion that runs deep through the law degree and frames all subjects that follow, and that we grapple with the choices of different political lenses from which we inevitably cannot escape in teaching abortion law. My claim is that what is excluded from the abortion law curriculum is every bit as political. Silence around women's experiences, and indeed, the politics of abortion service delivery and law as it plays out in the social world, have very real regulatory (in the broadest sense) effects. 
V. THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION: SECRECY, STIGMA, AND SHAME
Abortion is a word we say quietly, it's something many women sweep under the rug hurriedly, harboured with heavy guilt and shame.
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Although the provision and regulation of abortion is the subject of voluminous and often heated political and academic debate, the experiences of women who have terminated a pregnancy are notable primarily for their absence in these discussions.
48
In the research community, the same gap in respect of this experiential dimension of women's reproductive biographies can be seen. Despite a high prevalence of abortion in the UK where it is estimated that one in three women will have had an abortion, clinical research efforts have been strongly directed towards documenting the safety and efficacy of abortion, with few studies researching the 'voices of women requesting and experiencing abortion'. 49 This lacuna, which mirrors the reticence of women themselves to talk about their experiences of abortion 50 and contributes to the characterisation of abortion experiences as a 'common secret', 51 matters for at least two reasons. First, dominant official discourses typically foreground the moral and ethical dimensions of abortion, often in polarised ways and this has significant impacts on the way women seeking advice about abortion are characterised and treated. 52 Secondly, to the extent that these moralising discourses are reproduced in the wider society, the stigma they create means that women using abortion services face a powerful disincentive that has significant consequences for both individual and public health. 53 The characterisation of abortion as a well-kept secret constitutes a recurring theme in the available literature. Research around women's ability to talk about their individual experiences reveals the common perception of abortion being a difficult subject attended by stigma and shame. 54 Reticence to disclose is based on a perception that abortion is not widely accepted by society and sharing information might provoke disapproval. 55 Remaining silent constitutes a coping mechanism for fear of social condemnation, 56 but also further limits opportunities to disclose. Because abortion is frequently concealed, women will struggle to identify the abortion status of potential confidents, including close family members and friends. 57 Secrecy about abortion, however, is not absolute. Accessing an abortion necessitates disclosure in the clinical context with qualified personnel although we know little about the substance and extent of those disclosures and what clinical professionals learn about women's experience which could prove crucial to the enhancement of clinical care. Outside of the therapeutic context, there is evidence to support that while women guard their stories carefully, 58 some report selecting confidents, albeit do so selectively often justifying their decisions by reference to legitimizing factors such as youth, sexual assault, 59 or 'higher loyalties' towards existing family members to avoid negative devaluations of moral character. 60 Alternative managing strategies, however, include passing, covering, and telling outright lies to cover-up the loss of a pregnancy. 61 This combination of morality and silence perpetuates stigma and has been highlighted as a significant problem for women, individually and collectively. It is associated with negative individual and public health outcomes including psychological distress, 62 increasing feelings of loneliness and a sense of isolation 63 and leads to a lack of access to early and safe abortion services. 64 Secrecy also promotes the invisibility of abortion experience in the broader public sphere, in which alternative characterisations of abortion are left unchallenged, freely circulating as available resources to shape public opinion. In the context of the USA, Cockrill and Nack highlight how women's moralising justifications and excuses for abortion are drawn upon by advocates, policymakers and researchers in ways that further contribute to the social stigmatisation of abortion. 65 Such findings resonate with the UK, with concerns highlighted about the depiction of abortion in bioethical-jurisprudential and political discourse, 66 as an abstract or marginal experience, and in the British print media where abortion is framed in predominantly negative ways, constructing abortion as at odds with norms of femininity, with women's voices marginalised, and women's reasons for seeking terminations disregarded and over-simplified. 67 Unsurprisingly, secrecy and the resulting invisibility of women's experiences in public discourse have been identified as an issue that requires action. From scholarship sharing women's stories, 68 to internet-based approaches, 69 attempts are being made to reduce women's feelings of isolation and increase public awareness of the diverse biographies of women who do terminate. That abortion is secretive, remaining a 'hushed subject among friends, among family members' 70 presents a nasty irony. Its secretive status harms women, collectively and individual; it perpetuates the very stigma that makes silence inevitable. As Sanger notes of the USA, women 'do not talk about abortion because the cost of doing so is high and the matter cannot be discussed, whatever the woman's desire for advice, companionship, compassion or argument'. However, there is the rub; Sanger argues that while abortion is felt as an isolated and individual matter, there will be no honest discourse around women's reproductive and lived experience: 'only if something is discussed can it be understood and views change'. 71 In the context of the curricula, the same considerations should weigh hard on our minds in light of a characterisation of abortion which largely mirrors this suppression of women's voices. We need then, in our teaching of medical law (and ethics) to make the articulation of women's voices acceptable and central. We need to highlight how women's experiences of termination constitute a diverse and ubiquitous practice, rather than reflecting the 'moral' and 'legal' rhetoric of extremity and exceptionalism. 72 We need to learn how to draw these broader perspectives into the classroom and into our public world, so that these become forms of acceptable discourse.
While the extent to which the political should be redefined by reference to personal narratives is contested in various spheres, 73 arising in some debates as a strategy to mobilise technologies or access to drugs, deploying narrative as a pedagogical tool may seem controversial and overtly political. The inclusion of women's personal experience, of course, is what is captured by the slogan, 'the personal is political'. As Zimmerman notes, these acts of consciousness-raising are aimed at transforming the way that women categorise major aspects of their lives:
[T]hrough consciousness raising women 'see that "personal problems" shared by so many others -not being able to get out of the house often enough, becoming exhausted from taking care of the children all day, perhaps feeling trappedare really political problems. Understanding them is the first step toward dealing with them collectively'. 74 Far from an innocent tool of pedagogy or public 'understanding'-giving women voice sits right at the heart of a politics of persuasion. In the last decade there has been a 'burgeoning interest' in the use of narrative, driven by the 'belief that stories can be an especially potent means of creating opinion change'. 75 As Jones notes, 'narrative communication plays an important role in shaping opinion, preferences, and perceptions of risk, particularly when compared to more objectively oriented scientific and abstract styles of communication'. 76 But, but, but-nor is the exclusion of women's voices apolitical-the manipulation of, or failure to communicate key facts and ideas can be every bit as powerful in shaping opinion. What is notable about abortion is not only women's silence, but the noisiness of others in structuring its definition. More typically, abortion is portrayed as a third-party event-something that some other (more often bad and marginal) women do-leaving others to define the meaning, intentions, and circumstances of termination. In the marketplace of ideas, what abortion means is more often claimed by those most vocal, by those most opposed to termination of pregnancy, and those who seek reform of law in ways that would radically limit or remove women's freedom to terminate.
VI. 'UNDERSTANDING' ABORTION LAW
Abortion, choice, rights, and autonomy remain the key organizing concepts in the reproductive rights doctrine and political discourse. These concepts reign despite their limited utility in establishing, illuminating or protecting discernible sets of expectations attendant to human experiences related to reproductive decision making. They are self-executing, self-important, and self-centred concepts that have a life of their own. 77 Abstraction from the very act of abortion and the experiences of those involved in these reproductive worlds, renders abortion law a peculiarly clandestine character. Unwittingly, we legitimise a way of thinking about real-world problems, one that is deemed ethical, yet misses so much about the ethics of abortion. So too does this portrayal of abortion-by oblique and dispassionate reference to these characters-afford authority to a way of thinking about authority itself. It normalises a third-party way of talking about women's lives and bodies as if the ultimate judg(e)ment rightly sits in the 'public and political' domain to determine what happens to women's lives and bodies. At a distance. While that distance, as I argued earlier, leads to 'enchantment' and a vast simplification of problems that are far muddier in practice, it also removes the most significant elements of a social problem that have the capacity to move us and compel us to work hard in thinking these complex elements through. It is in this respect, our pedagogy can unwittingly construct a series of affective Chinese Walls. In particular, I point to two specific dimensions that I believe require much greater analysis as to their impact on student understanding of abortion law: the positioning of the 'legalities' of abortion, and the delivery of a critical feminist backdrop that runs throughout the contemporary law degree. Consideration of both not only points to the need for a new medical law curriculum in which women's voices matter, but to a far broader rethinking of the degree of which it is a part.
A. Ordering: Before the Law . . . because my pregnancy was unexpected and I did not want another child. My family was complete. After years of struggling to have the two children I did have, I was devastated when I saw that pink line on the pregnancy test as I contemplated turning 40. I quite literally wanted to die. forget how much authority 'the law' carries in the minds of those who have had minimal opportunity to 'see inside it'-eloquently expressed by Wade Mansell: 'it is difficult to see through rules if one sees through rules'. 79 It is an institution in all its mysticism that seems omniscient, 'rational', the product of collective intelligence rather than less virtuous reasons which find their place in law-making: politics, lobbying, professional self-interest, institutional inertia, ignorance, deference, etc. What the law is can too quickly become the blueprint, because the effort to start again is too great, and perhaps we trust ourselves less than these imagined omnipotent architects of the past. Indeed, the fact that abortion law is hard to dismantle and that the current policy approach is marked by regulatory inertia and path dependency 80 has been a doubleedged sword. In the UK, the stickiness of existing legal regimes delivers relative geographic fortune for England and Wales, and geographic misfortune for Northern Ireland where radical shifts in abortion policy are most demanded. The tendency to stick closely to how we do things-around which a broad variety of structures, policies, and institutions are organised-makes large-scale policy and regulatory changes far less likely than incremental ones. Here too, anti-abortion activists have perhaps been quicker to understand regulatory behaviour, focusing on 'incremental' strategies with the aim of restricting access to abortion services, rather than directing efforts at a wholesale dismantling of the Abortion Act 1967. 81 Nevertheless, there is no doubt, that while this new anti-abortion politics plays more often at the fringes of law, the existing archaic legal structure is often instrumental to these campaigns; the disjuncture between the seemingly strict terms of the Abortion Act 1967 and the more liberal provision of abortion services, reveals a range of vulnerabilities in respect of those who seek to 'tighten' up existing practice in line with the 'letter of the law'.
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Yet in our classes, we can afford more scope for imagination-to start that 'working out' from scratch. That the criminal law constitutes an archaic and problematic backdrop for governing contemporary abortion provision 83 might become much more apparent, with uncluttered lenses, rather than incrementally working our way through history slowly towards an Act already long premised on the back of criminality. In turn, it provides a critical lens on the human input involved in 'legal construction', which does much work in unpacking what 'law is', rendering it more fragile and fallible. These pedagogical acts invite students to do a great deal more work, but also to build up their own politics, acquired through the process of discovery of the wider range of characters in that story.
B. On Understanding: Feminism and the Politics of Choice
Strongly connected with the above is the need to generally unravel across the legal curriculum how we make law, make 'sense'. What I point to here is the importance of feminist legal education as a critical foundation for medical law, and abortion law as a 'discrete' topic. While medical law is positioned alongside other elective modules which offer the opportunity to analyse the philosophical or political underpinnings of law, Mansell notes how at this stage students will 'already have been immersed in, and possibly seduced by the intricacies of legal reasoning'. He argues that, at this point in legal education, 'it may be even too late to introduce them to the idea that the rules of the game are not neutral and that groups of people are likely to be differentially affected by the outcome'. 84 Germane to the present query, this speaks not only to students' preconceptions about 'the law' that I highlighted above, but also to the rather tall order of priming students at a late educational stage about the position of women in society and its relevancy to 'abortion law'. While many of us in practice supplement 'medical law' texts with a variety of more challenging and critical feminist materials, in practice without prior foundational understanding of feminist legal theory, our options are pretty limited. As Bender highlights,
[S]ome academic feminists have developed ways of using language that are nearly unintelligible to novices and laypersons. The issues being debated, theoretical positions being proposed, and strategies being recommended are highly sophisticated and vitally important, but hard to understand without a cue card or thorough training in the discourses of feminism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, continental philosophy, postructuralism . . .
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But so too, will our students be cognitively limited. In my own experience, as some very smart students come to take on medical law as a final year subject, what comes as a repeated shock to me is how little exposure they have had to the kind of scholarship that provides the tools for understanding structures of inequality and discrimination. In this respect, much of the language of abortion law, 'choice', 'bodily integrity', 'reproductive autonomy', increasingly sounds to my ears like shorthand I am throwing out-which we understand, but the journey of students to understanding needs a far longer gestational period to 'get' any of this, For feminists, pregnant women are the best judges of whether abortion is an appropriate response to their pregnancies. Pregnant women are best able to weigh the relevant factors -the particular consequences of pregnancy in their lives at that time and for the potential life under the circumstances. . . . In feminist analysis, abortion options are one part of women gaining control of their reproductive lives, an essential prerequisite to women freeing themselves from male dominance.
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The 'deep knowledge' embedded within this is not obvious to all, even if it is obvious to us. It is premised on a series of lessons across time that were not all dropped into one course alone. Initial appearances can be deceiving-many students are quick to 84 Mansell (n 79) vii. 85 Bender (n 40) 1257. 86 ibid 1263.
accept that women should have control over their bodies, and would not contest this-yet, yet . . . in the next breath be willing, for example, to criminalise women over 'causing their foetuses' foetal alcohol syndrome, because this 'velvet hammer' seems to them the appropriate way of deterring women from drinking during pregnancy; or to limit abortions for foetal abnormality to twenty-four weeks to promote 'equality' between disabled and non-disabled people. These approaches, which simultaneously buy into but substantively buy out of, what a feminist commitment requires, cannot be explained away by simple reference to 'post-feminism' or 'choice feminism'-ideologies underpinned by the assumption that 'structural factors which once systematically ordered social relations to the detriment of women have now been largely overcome', 87 so that what is left is a simple array of 'choices' for which women as with men, can be held equally accountable. My view is that contemplation of the shifts occurring in our lifetimes and the way the world appears to newer generations, might make post-or choice-feminism seem highly intuitive. Many university students are now socialised (at least in Britain) into a very distinctive linguistic world and embedded in cultural and institutional practices which constantly fly banners of political correctness. What was evident and explicit decades ago, through language, behaviour, and attitudes, has shifted into alternative and far more diffuse forms so that it is tantamount to a hidden agenda. Overt othering categories, race, gender, and disability, are transformed so as to become important linguistic markers for 'positive discrimination' in an era manifested by liberal post-race, post-patriarchal, post-eugenics politics. Enjoying an 'absent presence', 88 these categories are recoded and discursively performed through covert labels, 'national', 'genetic', 89 'merit', 90 'risk', or 'problem'. 91 The language and rules of the game have changed, so that specific sites of discrimination, such as racism, are reproduced through practices 'that are subtle, institutional and apparently nonracial', constituting a 'formidable political tool' and an 'ideological armoury of a covert and institutionalised system in the post-civil rights era'. 92 In the absence of a broader curricula that engages students directly with a wide set of transformations that more subtly organises categories of race, gender, and disability, we can hardly expect students to develop a sufficient understanding of what is at stake in medical law or indeed, why affording primacy of 'choice' or 'equality' within our legal frameworks often proves insufficient in offering either 'choice' or 'equality'. As such then, there is far more work for us to do than simply the teaching of medical law (and ethics). Without this broader and richer curriculum that contextualises the subject that we deliver, medical law becomes ironically 'post-feminist'. For this reason, we need to contemplate what is needed to appreciate the language we use. Our work then consists first of this foundational work for generations of students whose world(s) seems light years apart from ours, educationally and experientially. We need to thoroughly problematise the concept of freedom, and to undertake work that for us seems incredibly self-evident; unpacking the distinctions between formal and substantive equality, and explaining why women's bodies more often than not, mean that the former can never deliver equality. We need to show students that the world they take for granted constitutes a mere simulation of equality and to cut through that code to highlight the novel operationalisation of inequalities that otherwise lie out of sight.
VII. TOWARDS A NEW (FEMINIST) CURRICULUM
I am on visit visa here in UAE aspiring to get a job then I met someone who woos my heart and promised to find a job for me as well. I thought I met a good life partner [sic] . And then I got pregnant and he disappeared just like that. I was so scared. And didn't know what to do. No money, no job and in a country where I can get jailed for this circumstances [sic] . I was really thankful I got the chance to bump into women on web.
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I once knew a woman who had a backstreet abortion and died: a married woman, already the mother of three young children, who just could not afford another child. I was absolutely shocked. It was the first time I had come across abortion. I was in my early twenties, working at St Bartholomew's Hospital doing research, and I mentioned it to a group of doctors one lunch time. They looked at me in amazement, and said words to the effect: 'Well, where have you been all your life? Stay behind on Friday.' I discovered that Bart's and all the other London hospitals put wards aside every Friday and Saturday night for women who were brought in as a result of backstreet abortions -Friday being pay day. Bleeding, septic, sometimes dying. This was accepted everywhere. 94 What is striking about the medical law curriculum is the extraordinary potential for a subject that has global appeal and a programme that embraces perspectives from multiple disciplines so as to offer a richer clinical jurisprudence. While textbooks can be a misleading litmus of the international reach of medical law programmes, it is nevertheless a peculiarity that texts are so dominated by the position in England and Wales, with occasional nods to Northern Ireland, and postcards from other European countries where major abortion jurisprudence has been delivered by the European Court of Human Rights. Of course, much can be gleaned from analysis of the peculiarly devolved nature of abortion law within the UK and the differential lives lived on either side of the Irish Sea; nevertheless, a wider comparative social lens I think invites a great deal more. The problematic treatment of women's reproductive bodies, the often difficult and perilous lengths that women will go to where law restricts access to abortion services and, indeed, the political and governmental purposes that restrictive laws can serve, 95 become much more apparent at global scale. That broader focus also powerfully illustrates the inevitability of abortion, even when access to abortion is denied or severely restricted. Women's willingness to travel to abortion havens coupled with the presence of Internet-based programmes such as Women on Web who help facilitate the provision of medical abortion to women remotely, 96 underpin the permeability of national boundaries and the fragility (and hypocrisy) of 'domestic' law. Alongside these perspectives, what also brings this topic to life is analysis of those who fiercely campaign and strategise to prevent access to and the availability of lawful abortion. Here too, our world is connected as transatlantic 'guerrilla strategies', of on street harassment outside clinics and a broader armoury of techniques designed to marginalise abortion and abortion providers, cross-fertilise to the UK. 97 Our world has changed dramatically since the Abortion Act 1967 was passed; nevertheless, our need for abortion services or willingness to resort to measures to achieve a miscarriage remains constant. Indeed, it is here, as David Steel reflects, that our cultural memory is failing us,
The problem is we are now looking at a generation of politicians and clergy who have no idea what the situation was before 1967. The fact is that anybody under the age of 40 hasn't a clue what we are talking about. They just look at abortion and say, 'Oh dear, you know, why do we have so many abortions, we must tighten up the law', without thinking what would be the effect of repealing or restricting the 1967 Act. We would be back to where we were before. That is not something to be desired. 98 A historical appreciation of abortion in the UK as elsewhere, through the voices of those who know best, women, providers, activists, and politicians, not only proves instructive but also sobering. They bring the past to life, which is both enthralling and critical. While the 'backstreets' or the symbol of the 'coat-hanger' had strong emotive power in their day, they will have little resonance for those socialised in settings where liberal access to abortion is all they know. But pre-67 women have their contemporary counterparts who increasingly share online; we should be keen for students to find the parallels as well as broader cultural and jurisdictional factors that come to bear on women's differential experiences, country to country, region to region, from the urban to the rural.
These non-exhaustive though important concerns, speak to issues that I believe a contemporary syllabus adequately tackling 'abortion law' should include. In different ways, these approaches or perspectives from which abortion is viewed compete heavily with the current medical law methodology. And that is the point. A portrayal of abortion as a matter for debate in which women's own voices are deemed irrelevant, in which conversations can be had around the moral and legal rights and wrongs of abortion yet ignore its inevitability, that overlooks the very real dilemmas in which women find themselves which are common rather than exceptional, renders much of what is ethical or for that matter, legal, about abortion a fiction. It is those fictions which permit the construction of abortion regimes that position women's lives at the behest of others. In so doing, the world goes on with the myth of compliance with abortion laws, casting into the shadows a large population of women who continue to terminate irrespective of what is deemed by others to be moral or legal.
What this points to is the desirability of freshly authoring abortion law as a subject of learning and teaching, and one that aligns with our world view and centralises the voices and perspectives that have typically been missed or treated as supplemental in the story of abortion regulation. We need to centralise those voices. We cannot, in light of the broad evidence that underpins the secrecy and stigma of abortion, assume that even students with first-hand experience of abortion, or knowledge of friends or family that have terminated a pregnancy, will be willing or able to contribute those perspectives in class. Moreover, even of those who possess insight into termination of pregnancy, this will only take them so far. Far more is needed to achieve broader social literacy into the diverse reproductive experiences of women. Creating a space where it is both acceptable and normal to discuss abortion experience is part, I think, of what it means to teach abortion law well.
Nevertheless, for some, my invitation to construct what is self-consciously advancing a political and pro-choice agenda, of which the inclusion of women's experiences is a key part, is attended by a number of risks. I will confess my own anxieties. My concerns here have little to do with presenting a curriculum that seeks to indoctrinate, but rather relate to the risks that others of a different political leaning might follow suit: 'If a pro-life faculty member honestly believes that Roe v Wade was a bad decision, for example, shouldn't she express that view?' 99 Moreover, there is something deeper that irks me still, given that my refuge in abortion 'law' and indeed, 'ethics', may well have been unconsciously complicit, offering the illusion of an 'objective' and 'authoritative' platform that justifies women's continuing access to abortion under the Abortion Act 1967. The kinds of considerations I highlighted in relation to the authority of the law, the illusion of omnipotence, coupled with the recognition of women as at least to some degree 'moral' actors, constitute potentially weighty tools in sustaining what freedoms we have-even if they are not as extensive as we would wish. As such, there is a possibility that stripping away this illusion of reason renders a 'pro-choice' abortion law curriculum every bit as fragile.
Nevertheless, this risk is worth running. Anti-abortion campaigners have hardly been shy about expressing their opinions or taking action, sometimes violently, to facilitate their public agendas. In the absence of our politics, our voices, our experiences in the public sphere, our experience of abortion remains underground, spoken about in hushed terms and undertaken in private. On these matters, we need to revisit what is missed in public debate, within the traditional curriculum, and to adapt our approach to move and convince others about what we deeply believe in. In this respect, we need to think about the intellectual journeys which shaped our beliefs. Speaking personally, what affectively transported me was not the stuff of textbooks or the study 99 Scott (n 5) 492. of medical law; rather so much of it lay outside of the traditional curricula. From a grounding in feminist theory, a critical (and sociological) appreciation of law as an institution; 'adding up' what regulatory control over reproductivity means for so-called 'equality'; taking an active interest in women's experiences and seeing that if these stories appear at all-of lost control, isolation, of pride, satisfaction, and even joy-they were (and are) still whispered; to my sense of rage that others felt (and feel) entitled to even venture an opinion over what should happen to our bodies despite the profound ramifications for our lives. It is all that 'other' stuff that has been central to this essay, because it is the 'stuff' that affectively transported me-and continues to do so. These perspectives are largely invisible in our curricula and absent from broader public debate, revealing a peculiarly clandestine character to abortion law. It pushes underground the experiences of women (and providers) from the backstreets, it pushes beyond the reaches of our consciousness the political manoeuvring of antiabortion campaigners, it pushes away a characterisation of real lives and politics that tell us much about what abortion law means, and indeed, it removes from sight the broader range of reasons as to why we should care. Nevertheless, above all, what is missed perpetuates an intellectual and social habit of silence around women's experience of abortion-a form of undoubtedly inadvertent cultural censorship. Many of us may fail to have appreciated that through our silence, we have contributed to that.
These reasons, if accepted, point towards a curriculum for medical law and ethics that is both critical and explicitly feminist. Nevertheless, the extent to which a new curriculum can be created utilising the same tools, texts, and lines of enquiry that seem, in different ways to run counter to a feminist agenda, is open to question. The positioning of 'our' broader scholarship, including first-hand narratives of women, broader global perspectives, lessons from history, scholarship from the behavioural and social sciences, sits at odds with the current shape and form of current pedagogy. Sat alongside key texts, these perspectives typically appearing as a series of journal articles or web-links added to the virtual learning environment will always constitute mere 'supplements', seeming 'optional', less legitimate, and authoritative than texts that a publisher has 'validated'. 100 And there sits the irony: in the context of public discourses which determine the meaning of abortion and structure of abortion law, women's voices have typically been located at the periphery-seen as best as supplements, optional, less legitimate, and authoritative. For this reason, it may be time, even at the cost of losing all professional pretences as to our objectivity and neutrality, for us to reposition what is excluded, right at the centre of how we teach and practice abortion law. Perhaps ultimately what we need, as Leslie Bender highlighted several decades ago, are 'wholly new bioethics and law casebooks and anthologies that incorporate feminist perspectives throughout'.
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VIII. CONCLUSION I am neither ashamed nor proud of what I had to do. I always said that if I ever got pregnant that I would never get an abortion, but yet I did. I feel ashamed for ever judging anyone who did and feel slightly hypocritical. I am confident that I made the right decision and have no doubts. I will try to never judge anyone for the decisions they make in their life. 102 This article started with the over-arching query of what it means to teach abortion law well. You may well be disappointed that I offer no bold assertion of what 'teaching abortion law well' really means and what this topic, played out as an aspect of our broader medical law curricula should look like. Rather, the analysis itself is productive of a far wider range of questions. Nevertheless, on some other matters it is possible to be more assertive. I have argued, for example, that what is included and what is excluded from the curriculum around abortion law is political, no matter what we do. This is quite a critical point (even if it strikes you as obvious). There is no 'view from nowhere' and we should be careful to identify how and in what way the subjectmatter we deliver is framed and presented. It may be that that is the right starting point-the emphasis that there is 'no view from nowhere'-for our students, before any medical law is delivered. This may be part of the answer as to how we go about teaching abortion law (and medical law) well. We should not imagine that this is something our students will just 'get'. The current curriculum around abortion, which positions as central the 'ongoing ethical debate regarding how a woman's rights to autonomy, equality and reproductive health should be balanced against the moral respect due to the developing embryo or foetus', 103 not only constructs a typical starting point but frames the debate. What informs this purportedly ethical 'balancing' act is exclusive and privileges particular ways of knowing that are so far abstracted from our daily lives as to make that 'balancing' act far from 'balanced'. By virtue of what is excluded, the very act of 'balancing' on seemingly 'objective' considerations is made far easier and more acceptable than it should be. We need then to highlight, through story-telling what these notions of 'rights', 'reproductive autonomy', 'bodily integrity', and so on mean in the everyday-for otherwise these constitute empty labels in the absence of the social contexts to which they are inextricably tied.
I have pointed to the need for a new curriculum for abortion law, but proposed large (and controversial) brushstrokes as to what I think might be needed to achieve that; ones which would not only potentially impact on how we teach medical law, but also legal studies more generally. How our curriculum should or could look seems to me an issue best progressed through discussion with peers in the field, many of whom are not only strongly engaged with abortion politics and care deeply about women's rights and equality, but also with learning and teaching more generally. Nevertheless, how we go about this rethink presents no easy solutions. On the one hand, I have pointed to a clash of perspectives between the traditional mode of delivering medical law and ethics and a feminist approach; on the other hand, so too does this raise important questions about the role and place of different approaches-abstract, normative, experiential, biographical, descriptive, and empirical. These debates are long-standing in bioethics, and I do not pretend to have the reconciliatory answers, other than to say that abandoning any of these approaches would result in a serious intellectual loss for the field of medical law. And in many respects, that has been the point of this essay-some of these perspectives have always been missed-but the question of whether balance can be achieved through slotting in what has been deleted, reveals a fundamental tension between different approaches and world views.
My own view is that a broader review of the law degree in terms of the role it plays in delivering a critical legal education might well be necessary. Developing in our students a broader political, social, and biographical/experiential literacy seems necessary to help the process of translating a shorthand that we have tacit understanding of. In turn, this may support us in our learning and teaching when we point our students to what it is that gives ideas meaning, including the very stuff that provokes us to carethe diverse events and biographies of a wide range of actors who live the ethics and legality of the everyday. When we smooth over those gaps, through frames and approaches which subjugate the experiential, political, and social, we help perpetuate mythic assumptions about what it means to be a woman, to be reproductive, to be human, to be equal, to matter. Through our medical law and legal studies curricula, we have the opportunity to bind together our beliefs with our teaching, to be proud of our politics, and to include the 'stuff' of human life that moved us and has the capacity to move others. Perhaps, just perhaps, that is what it means to teach well.
